

## Message Text

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ORIGIN PM-07

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDA-19 SSO-00 NSCE-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10

DODE-00 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 H-03 /148 R

DRAFTED BY PM/DCA:HCAMITTA:ACDA/MEA:DSILKWOOD:SBC

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:RMILLER

EUR/RPM:ESTREATOR

PM/DCA:VBAKER

JCS:WLAFFERTY (INFO)

OSD/ISA:LMICHAEL

NSC:MPOWER

S/S - MR. GAMMON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 235476

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: UK QUESTIONS ON US STABILIZING MEASURES

MEMORANDUM

REF: USNATO 5522

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

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GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

1. WE BELIEVE THAT ALLIED VIEWS PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSALS ACTUALLY PRESENTED TO THE EAST. GUIDANCE REQUESTED REFTEL ON POINTS MADE IN PARA 2 OF UK PAPER FOLLOWS (LETTERING BELOW CORRESPONDS TO THAT IN UK PAPER). THESE POINTS ADDRESS SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ARRIVING AT A NATO DECISION ON STABILIZING MEASURES, AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE USG ARGUMENTATION FOR OR AGAINST ANY MEASURE.

(A) THE MEASURE CALLING FOR PREANNOUNCED MOVEMENT OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA IS DESIGNED INTER ALIA TO POLITICALLY INHIBIT THE MOVEMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS INTO THE AREA IN TIME OF TENSION. THE MEASURE MUST NECESSARILY BE RECIPROCAL. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE MEASURE

PROVIDES FOR PREANNOUNCING "CERTAIN ANTICIPATED MOVEMENTS" OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES INTO AND OUT OF THE GUIDELINES AREA. THIS FORMULATION ESTABLISHES THAT ONLY THOSE MOVEMENTS DEFINED IN THE AGREEMENT NEED BE PREANNOUNCED. SCHEDULED REFORGER MOVEMENTS OBVIOUSLY COME UNDER THE HEADING OF ACTIVITIES REQUIRING PREANNOUNCEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT UNANTICIPATED, SIGNIFICANT SOVIET ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO ALLIED CONSIDERATION OF INVOLVING THE REFORGER FORCE IN POSSIBLE COUNTER MEASURES WOULD RAISE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS AS TO THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. WE DO SEE MERIT IN THE WORKING GROUP PROPOSAL (AC/276-D(72)4) THAT THE NUMBER OF DAYS OF PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD VARY WITH THE SIZE OF THE MOVEMENT. THIS IS A MODIFICATION WHICH THE ALLIANCE MIGHT TAKE UNDER CONSIDERATION.

(B) THE ANNEX ATTEMPTS TO SET OUT THE STABILIZING MEASURES IN DETAIL IN ORDER TO EXAMINE WHAT WILL BE REQUIRED IN SPECIFIC TERMS. WE HAVE OUTLINED THE DETAILED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEASURES IN ORDER TO HELP FOCUS ALLIANCE DISCUSSIONS ON CONCRETE PROPOSALS WHICH SHOW BOTH THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MEASURES AND THEIR

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RECIPROCAL IMPACT ON NATO AS WELL AS PACT FORCES. IT WILL ALSO BE NECESSARY TO NEGOTIATE SUCH DETAILS WITH THE EAST IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE POSSIBLE LOOPHOLES AND EVENTUALLY TO MAKE THE MEASURES EFFECTIVE IN ACHIEVING THE DESIRED INHIBITIONS ON SOVIET FORCE MOVEMENTS. WITHOUT THE DETAIL, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE RECIPROCAL IMPACT ON NATO FORCES COULD BE EVALUATED NOR COULD THE REQUIREMENTS TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION BE FULLY DEVELOPED.

THE "10" REFERRED TO SHOULD BE 10 PERCENT, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS A SIGNIFICANT FIGURE IN TERMS OF THE POTENTIAL NUMBER OF TROOPS INVOLVED. WE ESTIMATE THAT DURING EACH SEMI-ANNUAL PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT PERIOD THE SOVIETS ROTATE ABOUT 100,000 MEN BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE COUNTRIES IN THE NGA. ASSUMING A TWO-MONTH ROTATION PERIOD, WE WOULD THUS EXPECT THE PEAK LOADS OF PERSONNEL MOVEMENT TO APPROXIMATE 50,000 MEN PER MONTH. IN ADDITION, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THESE STABILIZING MEASURES DO NOT LIMIT THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL EXCHANGED, THUS THE TOTAL COULD BE MUCH GREATER. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE THAT CHANGES OF 10 PERCENT WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY SIGNIFICANT IN SIZE TO REQUIRE ADVANCE NOTICE.

(C) IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PROPOSED LIMIT ON TRAINING WITHIN 50 KM OF THE FRG/GDR BORDER WOULD APPLY ONLY TO MAJOR EXERCISES OUTSIDE DEFINED TRAINING AREAS. THE AIM IS TO REMOVE POTENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INTIMIDATION OR UNCERTAINTY. WE BELIEVE SUCH EXERCISES COULD INCREASE INSTABILITY AND COULD BE USED TO MASK PREPARATIONS FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK. IF THE PROPOSED LIMIT IS LIKELY TO INTERFERE WITH ALLIED EXERCISES, ANOTHER LIMIT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED, BUT WE BELIEVE PROVISION FOR SOME AREA ALONG THE BORDER IN WHICH EXERCISES WOULD BE PROHIBITED COULD BE USEFUL TO THE ALLIES. IF THIS MEASURE WERE APPLIED ONLY TO SOVIET AND US FORCES, SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS WOULD PERHAPS FALL AWAY. WE WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO CONTINUE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NEED TO AVOID SETTING PRECEDENTS FOR PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS.

(D) WE ARE EXAMINING LIMITING OR GIVING NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MOVEMENTS OF FORCES WITHIN THE AREA (MEASURES II AND III OF PARA 29 OF THE AGREED ALLIED PAPER). WE,

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OF COURSE, WILL TAKE THE UK VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR ANALYSES AND WOULD WELCOME THOSE OF OTHER ALLIES AND SACEUR.

(E) WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROPOSED MEASURES WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL BOOKKEEPING AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES. WE HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THIS QUESTION IN DETAIL AND BELIEVE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON HOW REQUIREMENTS MIGHT BEST BE MET WOULD BE USEFUL. WE WOULD WELCOME THOUGHTS AS TO SIMPLIFICATION FROM OTHER ALLIES AND SACEUR.

(F) IT IS TRUE THAT THESE MEASURES CONTAIN NO SPECIFIC VERIFICATION PROVISIONS; WE HAVE REGARDED THEM AS AIDS TO VERIFICATION AND WARNING RATHER THAN AS

MEASURES WHICH WOULD IN THEMSELVES REQUIRE VERIFICATION.

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** AGREEMENT DRAFT, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS, TROOP REDUCTIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 30 NOV 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** boyleja  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Executive Order:** GS  
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**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** USNATO 5522  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** boyleja  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 22 AUG 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <22-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <10-Oct-2001 by boyleja>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: UK QUESTIONS ON US STABILIZING MEASURES MEMORANDUM  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO  
**To:** NATO BRUSSELS  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005